The Indus Waters Treaty: The Background, The Pahalgam Suspension and The Future

The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 has often been described in extremes. To some, it is an extraordinary act of Indian generosity. To others, it is a treaty that locked India into unequal obligations while giving Pakistan most of the river system. The truth lies somewhere deeper. The treaty was both goodwill and practicality , both a diplomatic concession and an engineering compromise, both a product of post Partition anxiety and Himalayan geography.

The Indus basin is not a simple river map. It is a vast natural system shaped by mountains, valleys, plains and centuries of settled agriculture. The six rivers, Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej , do not flow through terrain of equal usefulness for both countries. After Partition, India became the upper riparian state on many of these rivers, but Pakistan’s Punjab remained heavily dependent on their downstream flows for agriculture. India, meanwhile, needed water for its own development in Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir.

The treaty divided the system in a striking way. India received the three eastern rivers, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej , while Pakistan received the dominant use of the three western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab . In volume terms, Pakistan got access to nearly 80 percent of the system’s waters, while India received about 20 percent . On paper, this appears heavily tilted against India. But in practical terms, the eastern rivers were far easier for India to develop for irrigation, canals and drinking water. The western rivers, though larger, flowed through difficult Himalayan and sub Himalayan terrain, making large scale diversion into the Indian plains an enormous engineering, financial and political challenge.

This is where the treaty must be understood with some fairness. In 1960, India was a young republic with limited capital, urgent food security needs and major development pressures. Diverting significant volumes from the Chenab, Jhelum or Indus into the plains of Punjab, Haryana or Rajasthan would have required massive tunnels, storage reservoirs, canals, lifts, land acquisition and power systems. These rivers are excellent for hydropower , because steep gradients help generate electricity. But they are not as conveniently placed for large gravity based irrigation as the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej system.

So, India did not merely give away water that was easily usable. It gave away water that was valuable, but difficult to use at scale from the Indian side at that time. The eastern rivers could be harnessed through projects such as Bhakra Nangal, Pong, Ranjit Sagar and the Rajasthan canal system . The western rivers demanded much more complex engineering. That practical reality helped shape the treaty.

Yet practicality does not erase concession. India accepted restrictions even on its permitted use of the western rivers. It could build run of river hydropower projects , use water for domestic purposes and undertake limited agricultural use, but these came with detailed design conditions, storage limits and notification requirements. Pakistan did not have a formal veto, but it had the ability to examine designs, raise objections and take disputes through treaty mechanisms.

That is why some major Indian projects on the western rivers became test cases. The Salal Hydroelectric Project on the Chenab required a bilateral agreement in 1978 between India and Pakistan. Baglihar , also on the Chenab, was challenged by Pakistan and later examined by a Neutral Expert under the treaty mechanism. Kishenganga , on a Jhelum tributary, went to international arbitration, where India’s right to divert water for power generation was upheld, but with conditions including minimum downstream flow. These examples show that India did not need Pakistan’s permission in a simple legal sense, but it often had to pass through a long corridor of objections, reviews, negotiations and dispute resolution before proceeding.

The Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025 changed the political atmosphere around the treaty. India announced that the treaty would be held in abeyance, arguing that normal cooperation could not continue while cross border terrorism remained unresolved. This did not mean India had suddenly built dams overnight or stopped Pakistan’s water. It meant India was no longer willing to treat the treaty as untouchable while Pakistan enjoyed its benefits and India absorbed the security costs.

After the suspension, several pending and delayed hydropower projects gained urgency. Reports said India moved to speed up work on Pakal Dul, Kiru, Kwar and Ratle on the Chenab, while larger projects such as Sawalkote , Bursar and Kirthai also returned to the strategic discussion. Some reports also noted steps such as reservoir flushing at existing projects like Salal and Baglihar , activities earlier constrained by treaty obligations. The shift was not merely administrative. It was a message that India would now seek to maximise its own rights and infrastructure capacity without allowing every project to be slowed by Pakistan’s objections.

But even now, the idea that India can simply divert all western river waters into its plains is an exaggeration. Moving Chenab or Jhelum waters into Indian Punjab would be an engineering campaign, not a political slogan. It would require reservoirs in difficult terrain, long tunnels, inter basin transfer links, environmental approvals, seismic safety, large capital expenditure and years of construction. Water diversion is not like closing a gate. Rivers carry silt, floods, ecology, settlements and history with them.

This is also why India’s position has to be read carefully. India has no real intention, and no practical need, to deny Pakistan every drop of water for its agriculture. Pakistan’s Punjab has depended on these flows for centuries. Those lands have been watered by geography long before the treaty and long before modern states drew borders. The natural flow of the basin, as the universe has designed it, will continue to sustain those lands. India’s argument is not that Pakistan’s farmers must be punished. India’s argument is that Pakistan cannot expect permanent treaty generosity while hostility and terrorism continue.

There is a domestic irony here too. Within India, water disputes between states often remain bitter and unresolved. Punjab and Haryana continue to clash over the SYL canal . Telangana and Andhra Pradesh have seen repeated disputes over Krishna and Godavari waters, with projects delayed, boards challenged and political tempers rising. If states within the same Union can fight so fiercely over water shares, it is remarkable that India and Pakistan, after Partition and wars, kept the Indus arrangement alive for more than six decades.

That is what makes the Indus Waters Treaty unusual. It was not a sentimental document. It was a pragmatic bilateral accord born from geography, need and the desire to avoid permanent water war. India made large concessions, but those concessions were not irrational in 1960. They reflected the terrain, the financial limits of the time and the immediate utility of the eastern rivers for India’s plains.

The question today is different. India’s engineering capacity has grown. Its power demand has grown. Jammu and Kashmir’s development needs have grown. Climate stress has grown. And the patience for one sided restraint has shrunk. The Pahalgam suspension, therefore, is not the end of the treaty’s spirit. It is a warning that the old framework cannot remain frozen while the strategic environment changes.

The future of the Indus system will likely not be a story of India denying Pakistan water. It will be a story of India building more storage, more hydropower, more local irrigation and more bargaining power within its own territory. Pakistan will still receive the great bulk of western river flows, as it has for generations. But India may no longer accept that every project on its side must wait endlessly for Pakistan’s comfort.

In that sense, the treaty’s history is best understood in three layers: goodwill, practicality and correction . Goodwill made India accept an unequal looking arrangement. Practicality made that arrangement workable in 1960. The future will now be shaped by India’s attempt to correct the imbalance without destroying the river system or punishing ordinary farmers across the border.

The Indus Waters Treaty survived because both sides needed water more than they needed another battlefield. Even after suspension, that truth remains. The rivers will still flow. The question is whether the old restraints on India will flow with them.